We examine the role of bank leverage in an attempt to explain why …nancial crises unfold at a time when the economy appears to be less fragile to crisis risks. To this end, we extend the model introduced by Diamond and Rajan (2012) to a variant where the probability of …nancial crises varies endogenously. In our model, households' liquidity preference, modeled following Allen and Gale (1998), plays a key role in precipitating a crisis because a high liquidity demand under a highly leveraged banking system are likely to expose the economy to higher crisis risks. We consider two examples of a "safe" environment: (i) the households'liquidity demand tends to be low on average and (ii) the probability of bank bailouts is relatively high. Using numerical analysis, we show that the "safer"environment could incentivize banks to raise their leverage, resulting in more vulnerable banking system to liquidity shocks that endanger the entire economy.
Introduction
The 2007-08 global …nancial crisis directed renewed attention to the anatomy of …nancial sector disruptions. Maturity mismatch and the anticipation of bailouts (e.g., Greenspan put), among other factors, are broadly considered to have played critical roles. A maturity mismatching structure of bank assets and liabilities to provide the liquidity insurance for depositors (and other types of short-term creditors) has long been emphasized as a crucial element in understanding …nancial crises since Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . More recently, Diamond and Rajan (2012, hereafter DR) argued that the so-called Greenspan put may have encouraged banks to increase their illiquidity, making them highly exposed to crisis risks.
In this paper, we aim to explore what may give rise to a highly leveraged banking system, resulting in a high probability of a crisis. Among others, we solely focus on changes in macroeconomic "fundamentals" rather than unmodeled sunspots. We integrate the benchmark model by DR with the utility function employed in Allen and Gale (1998) and derive the endogenous probabilities of …nancial crises. Using the framework, we explore how banks'risk taking interacts with changes in the macroeconomic factors including policy interventions and how the crisis probability is determined as a consequence of such interactions.
The changes in macroeconomic fundamentals that we consider in this paper are twofold. The …rst is changes in the distribution of liquidity preference shock. It is widely acknowledged that, in the run-up to the 2007-08 crisis, the global …nancial markets as well as the real economy appeared to be increasingly stable in the era of Great Moderation. In our model, we translate this stability in the …nancial market into changes in the distribution of liquidity preference shock. More speci…cally, we assume that, during the period of the Great Moderation, the liquidity demand by creditors (i.e., households in our model) decreased on average, re ‡ecting the fact that investors preferred illiquid investment (e.g., mortgage-backed securities) to liquid assets. Such an underlying change in the liquidity preference appears to make the banking sector less fragile, or "safer,"because the banking sector is faced with smaller upper tail risk of liquidity demand that precipitates a crisis.
As the second change in macroeconomic fundamentals, we consider a shift in the policy stance of the government (or the central banks). The experience of the 2007-08 …nancial crisis provokes discussions on a variety of policy measures that have been taken to enhance the resilience of the banking sector. Among numerous practices, we focus on emergency liquidity provisions (ELP), one of the most widely undertaken policy measures across the economies during the crisis period. In the speci…c context of our model, we consider an increase in probability that the government (or a central bank) embarks on ELPs in an attempt to forestall a …nancial crisis. This probability of ELPs is interpreted as the government's policy stance for maintaining the …nancial stability. We analyze how the crisis probabilities are a¤ected if the government becomes more concerned about …nancial stability with more frequent interventions to bailout banking system. In other words, we ask whether a change in the government's policy stance represented by an increased probability of ELPs would reduce the probability of a …nancial crisis.
We …nd that both changes in the macroeconomic fundamentals toward …nancial stability could expose the economy to higher risks of …nancial crises. A key to understand these "the safer, the riskier" cases is the banks'endogenous systemic risk taking. We show that the banks'risk taking with a higher leverage o¤sets or even dominates the exogenous improvement of the macroeconomic fundamentals in terms of the probability of …nancial crises. In particular, when the liquidity demand is expected to be low, banks feel at ease and then raise their leverage. The increased leverage can result in the higher risk of …nancial crises. In a similar vein, the elevated probability of ELPs would also incentivize banks to be more leveraged, resulting in higher crisis probabilities. These two examples may help better understand why the 2007-08 …nancial crisis unfolded at the time when the banking sector was broadly believed to be increasingly surrounded by improved fundamentals.
Our paper di¤ers from related works on …nancial (in)stability in several aspects. Our …rst example associated with the era of Great Moderation is related to Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012). They calibrate the model to the "low risk" economy where the economy is in the period of the Great Moderation and show that banks issue more short-term debt than the "high risk" economy calibrated to the economy after the Great Moderation. While their focus lies in the ampli…cation mechanism of the model as a result of higher leverage of the banking sector, ours points to the e¤ect of bank leverage on the probability of …nancial crises. Our second example that higher expectations of bank bailouts may expose the economy to higher risks of …nancial crises is also related to in ‡uential works by DR and Fahri and Tirole (2012). DR argue that direct support to insolvent banks undermines the disciplinary e¤ect of deposits and suggest that interest rate intervention dominates unconstrained directed bank bailouts. They further discuss that, even under interest rate intervention, banks take on more risks through higher leverage. Fahri and Tirole (2012) focus on strategic complementarities on the determination of banks'leverage under anticipated bailouts and explore the optimal macro-prudential regulation. Our result on bank bailouts basically relies on the framework by DR and is obtained in a di¤erent and simpler way. Our scope is limited to a consequence of anticipated bailouts but we assess the frequency of …nancial crises numerically under seemingly desirable changes in the government's policy stance towards …nancial stability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of banking system, which is an extension of DR. In Section 3, we calibrate the model and discuss the e¤ect of the changes in distribution of the liquidity preference on the probability of …nancial crises. Section 4 further extends the DR's model to incorporate the ELP by the government and discusses our results that predict higher crisis probabilities under such interventions. Section 5 concludes.
The Model

Agents, Endowment, Technology and Preference
We consider a variation of the economy described by DR. Most of the assumptions are maintained in line with the original DR model except for the households'preference, which we replace with that in Allen and Gale (1998) to focus on the aggregate liquidity shock. In DR, the random shock arises from the uncertainty over future income and DR consider unobservable …nite discrete aggregate states where households expect either high income or low income. By contrast, we eliminate uncertainty with respect to households'income while incorporating a more straightforward random shock regarding liquidity preference into our model. Speci…cally, the household utility function is We focus on the endogenous crisis probability subject to aggregate preference/liquidity shocks.
In what follows, we …rst describe the agent's decisions after the realization of and then the banks' choice of D before the realization of .
Households
A household chooses its withdrawal w 1 , given deposit face value D, the one-period gross interest rate r 12 (from date 1 to 2), and the preference shock . The interest rate r 12 represents the price for liquidity which equates the withdrawal with the value of liquidated project. Given that a bank run is not taking place, the households'maximization problem is given by
s:t: C 1 = e 1 + w 1 (1)
where e t is the household's endowment at date t. 4 As discussed, can be interpreted as a "liquidity shock" because determines the need for liquidity for each period. When is low, households' deposits are likely to be fully repaid by banks over the two periods, which means the households fully smooth out their consumption at normal times. As we will show later in detail, however, exceeding a threshold value of the liquidity preference shock, the households'deposits are not fully repaid at date 1. Then, a bank run takes place and the household receive only X 1 at date 1 and nothing from banks. Thus, the households fail to smooth out their consumption and end up with
In what follows, we denote as the probability of bank runs (i.e., …nancial crises).
When the households can smooth out their consumption, the intertemporal …rst-order condition for consumption
is satis…ed. Meanwhile, the budget constraint holds with equality. Hence, the withdrawal can be written as
This extension of the preference enables us to assess the probability of …nancial crises endogenously and continuously. Furthermore, it is convenient to de…ne the households'lifetime income at normal times by m:
The log-utility implies that consumption at normal times is proportional to m, namely C 1 = m and C 2 = (1 ) r 12 m.
Entrepreneurs and Bankers
Entrepreneurs and bankers in our model replicate those in DR. As discussed in Diamond and Rajan (2001), each banker is a relationship lender that has obtained special knowledge of the entrepreneurs' business, and this knowledge assures the banker's collection skill to acquire a fraction
of the output from the entrepreneurs. The collection skill is assumed to be not transferable to other lenders. Let the banker's assets be A (r 12 ). As assumed in DR, at date 1, bankers receive signals Y 2 that perfectly predict each realization ofỸ 2 . 5 Each banker is assumed to attract many entrepreneurs through the competitive o¤er on the loan, resulting in the identical portfolio shared by all the symmetric banks. Then, each banker's assets A (r 12 ) can be expressed as
where the …rst and second terms of the equation indicate the values of liquidated projects and completed projects evaluated at t = 1, respectively. In (5), Y 2 (r 12 ) denotes the threshold return of projects satisfying Y 2 (r 12 ) = r 12 X 1 = . Bankers liquidate a project, whose return falls short of the opportunity cost, to meet the households'liquidity demand. Furthermore, it can be easily shown
Banks turn to be insolvent if the solvency condition D A (r 12 ) is violated. In this case, a bank run is precipitated: The bankers liquidate all of the entrepreneurs' projects, repay X 1 to households, and lose all their assets. We then de…ne the threshold interest rate r 12 which satis…es 5 Allen and Gale (1998) make a similar assumption for this interim signal.
the solvency condition with equality:
where r 12 strictly decreases with D since A 0 ( ) < 0. In other words, a higher level of D requires a lower level of r 12 for the bankers to be solvent.
Liquidity Market
As far as a run is not taking place, the liquidity market clearing condition holds:
where the equilibrium interest rate r 12 is uniquely determined. The left-hand side of the equation Along with (7), the threshold interest rate r 12 allows us to de…ne as the threshold value of that precipitates bank runs if and only if > :
Since r 12 is strictly decreasing in D, (8) indicates that is strictly decreasing in D. When we emphasize this relationship between and D, we express as (D) and express its derivative as 0 (D). We also note that, because a larger liquidity shock increases households'withdrawal, by de…nition, a smaller points to a higher crisis probability. Using , we can express the endogenous probability of a crisis as ( ) = 1 F ( ), where F ( ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of .
Bank' s Choice of Leverage
We also follow Diamond and Rajan's (2001) argument for the reason why bankers issue demand deposits D: as a commitment device to compensate for the lack of transferability of their collection skill and to promote liquidity creation. In line with this argument, the bankers need to determine the face value of deposits before observing in a competitive banking sector. As a result of competition, the bankers are forced to make a competitive o¤er of deposits for households. The competitive o¤er maximizes the household welfare (Allen and Gale, 1998), taking the distribution of as given. 6 Here, the choice of D has a one-to-one relationship with the bank's leverage. The bank's leverage in our model can be de…ned as D= [A (r 12 ) D] and is determined once D is chosen.
Therefore, the optimal choice of bank leverage always coincides with the optimal choice of D in our model.
Formally, the banks'maximization problem is given by
subject to (4) and (8), where the …rst term of (9) corresponds to the utility from consumption under no crisis while the second term points to the utility from consumption under a crisis. The integral is taken over 2 [0; ] for the …rst term, because any that is lower than the threshold value does not precipitate crises. In contrast, the second term indicates that banks recognize that consumption smoothing is impossible for > .
The …rst-order condition for D is given by
where m = e 1 + D + e 2 =r 12 and f ( ) is the probability density function evaluated at = , de…ned by (8) . The partial derivative @r 12 =@D can be implicitly de…ned by the liquidity market clearing condition (7).
In choosing the optimal D, banks strike a right balance between the marginal bene…t and cost 6 In the model, the bankers in fact are maximizing their own pro…ts by household welfare maximization.
of increasing D on behalf of the households. The right-hand side of (10) can be interpreted as the marginal bene…t of increasing D through changes in households'lifetime income and interest rate.
Due to the log period utility, the households'utility can be expressed as log m + (1 ) log r 12 + log + (1 ) log (1 ). A higher D allows households to receive higher income from their deposits and to enjoy more consumption at both dates. 7 Hence, as far as is smaller than the threshold value , households obtains higher returns from increasing D.
The left-hand side of (10) 3 Simulation of the Benchmark Model
Calibration
The numerical example that we consider here broadly follows the parameter set chosen by DR. Let e 1 = 0:65, X 1 = 0:95, Y 2 = 0:0, Y 2 = 3:5, and = 0:9. Instead of the discrete states for endowment at t = 2 in DR, we take a single constant value e 2 = e 1 and assume that a liquidity shock is generated from the beta distribution with two parameters that give us = 0:5 and = 0:07, where and denote the mean and the standard deviation of , respectively. The marked di¤erence in our model from DR lies in the fully endogenous probability of a crisis, = 1 F ( ), which e¤ectively replaces the exogenously given probability for an "exuberant"state to materialize in DR.
Under the parameter set with a mean of 0.50 and a standard deviation of 0.07 for , the banks set the level of the deposit face value D at 1.08, striking a proper balance between the return from high leverage and the risk of a run. The resulting probability of a crisis is 11.0 percent. Figure   1 plots the households'utility over a variety of deposit face values D. The …gure also articulates the sub-components of the utility. The smooth bell shape of the utility can be understood as the weighted average of the two sub-components, (i) the expected utility in the absence of a run E (U jno run) and (ii) the expected utility under a run E (U jrun). In the …gure, the probability of a crisis is represented by the ratio of the distance along the vertical axis between the solid and the upper dashed lines to that between the upper and lower dashed lines.
3.2 The Safer, the more secured?: Structural Changes in the Distribution of
Liquidity Preference
It came as surprise to many people at a time when the 2007-08 …nancial crisis followed the Great Moderation. The model discussed in this paper suggests a possible explanation of why the …nancial crisis unfolded at a time when the banking sector appeared to be increasingly more secured in the era of Great Moderation. 8 The experiment that we perform here investigates changes in the distribution of the underlying shock . Table 1 compares the crisis probabilities for a few cases where we change while keeping unchanged. A decrease in implies that banks …nd a smaller upper tail risk (i.e., a risk of a large ) -put di¤erently, they recognize that the fundamentals are safe. Recall that the probability of a crisis was 11.0 percent in the initial "risky"distribution with the mean of 0.50 (Case 1 in Table   1 ). With the lower mean of 0.35 in the "safer" distribution, however, the probability of a crisis increases from 11.0 to 12.4 percent (Case 2 in Table 1 ). Therefore, it is not always true that the "safer" the economy is, the more secure the banking system is.
Why does this "the safer, the riskier" happen? The key to understanding this result lies in banks' risk taking. Table 1 also reports that the banks' leverage increases when declines. As discussed so far, banks in our model have a strong incentive to raise D when they face a smaller upper tail risk. Though a higher leverage of banks gives rise to higher returns to households, it also increases the risk of the insolvency of banks. This elevated risk is re ‡ected in a decline in . 8 See Bernanke (2004), for example.
As shown in the last row in the table, declines from 0.58 in Case 1 to 0.43 in Case 2. Thus, despite the reduction in the ex-ante crisis probability re ‡ecting the safer fundamentals, the banks' risk taking e¤ect can result in a higher ex-post crisis probability. Figure 2 shows how banks'leverage a¤ects the ex-post crisis probability through . If banks do not react to the change in the distribution of , remains unchanged and the resulting ex-ante crisis probability sharply drops to nearly zero. In contrast, if banks react to the macroeconomic changes correctly, decreases from R to S , giving rise to a higher ex-post crisis probability (region A in Figure 2 ). The economic interpretation of the decrease in is that the "safer" distribution incentivizes banks to raise leverage, taking on more risks. The higher leverage makes banks more vulnerable to liquidity shocks, and the elevated vulnerability can endanger the economy. As a result, the more secure fundamentals can leave the economy exposed to higher crisis risks. Figure 3 con…rms that the crisis probability can be plotted as a U-shaped curve against . The fact that the crisis probability is downward-sloping over a wide range of indicates that our result is not an artifact of our arbitrary choice of parameters but can be widely observed in our model.
The Model with Emergency Liquidity Provisions
Characterization
We next extend the model introducing the emergency liquidity provision (ELP) by the government/the central bank (GC, hereafter) who aims to rescue troubled banks and to prevent a crisis.
It is widely argued that the ELP could help mitigate or prevent crises when the banking sector is poised on the brink of a crisis. At the same time, however, policy makers are concerned about an apparent trade-o¤ arising from moral hazard. If the GC makes announcement of such liquidity provisions, banks come to realize that they will be bailed out at a time of …nancial distress. A consequence is that they can be more leveraged than otherwise, resulting in higher risks of crises.
In practice, the liquidity provisions during the time of a …nancial distress of the banking sector may not always be carried out. ELPs are, more or less, at the discretion of the GC, depending on the extent of …nancial distress and on other factors that are not modeled here. 9 For this reason, this section assumes that ELPs are activated as an random event, rather than assuming that the GC always acts for maintaining the …nancial stability by bailing out banks near crisis. In this context, we incorporate the exogenous probability of the ELP into our analysis. Interpreting the probability as the GC's policy stance on pursuing the …nancial stability, we ask how the GC's policy stance on the …nancial stability a¤ects the crisis probability. We further investigate how the banks' over-optimistic anticipation on the policy stance could amplify the …nancial instability. 10 
Implementation
Suppose that the GC imposes a levy on bank size measured by banks'liability to …nance their ELP for bailing out banks near crisis. Let be the tax rate imposed by the GC on banks'liability D.
The GC collects the levy of r 12 D at date 2 from banks. This amount is D, if it is measured by the consumption goods at date 1. Accordingly, the banks'solvency condition can be rewritten as
Thus, this levy restricts the bank's liability in its size, reining in banks'leverage.
The to-be-collected levy can be used for the ELP when banks are faced with the liquidity shortage at date 1. More speci…cally, in terms of operation, the GC can collect a tax from households at date 1 after the realization of and step into the liquidity market to provide the liquidity M .
Then, at date 2, the GC can fully compensate for the tax, which households paid at date 1, by transferring income from banks to households together with interest payment. As a result, households' lifetime income can be kept unchanged. This ELP is feasible as far as the supply of liquidity M does not exceed the total amount of bank levy equal to D.
With this operation in mind, suppose, as an experiment, that the GC makes an ELP for a 9 An immediate factor that needs to be taken into account in the real world is the …scal condition (e.g., levels of public debt). We leave such factors out of the scope of this paper. 1 0 We perform this analysis for the purpose of positive analysis rather than normative analysis. As suggested by Gale (1998, 2007) , the laissez-faire banks would choose the socially optimal decision on their leverage because the current model does not include any welfare-reducing externalities. The purpose of our analysis here is solely for evaluating policy measures that have been taken by the GC. constant probability p. For the remaining probability 1 p, the GC wastes the levy for nothing or uses it for the GC's own consumption that has no bene…t for the banking system. Our interpretation is that the GC tends to make e¤orts more proactively to keep the economy safer for a larger p, because the ELP is perceived to help stabilize the banking system. Accordingly, this probability p is considered the policy stance indicating to what extent the GC is proactive in maintaining the …nancial stability. We assume that the probability of ELPs is independent of and is predetermined before is realized. Hereafter, unless otherwise noted, the probability is publicly known to banks and households.
Due to the GC's randomized bailout, we need to consider two cases: with and without the activation of the ELP. In the case of no intervention, which occurs at the probability 1 p, the solvency constraint with equality rede…nes the threshold interest rate beyond which a …nancial crisis is precipitated.
Together with this newly de…ned r 12 , we de…ne L as
from the liquidity market clearing condition (7). We emphasize that L is the threshold value of that precipitates a crisis if > L and if the GC does not provide emergency liquidity for the market. In parallel with , L remains to be a decreasing function of D. We express L as L (D)
and its derivative as In the second case, the GC carries out the ELP. With the probability p, the GC provides liquidity M D to bailout the banks if they are faced with > L . In this case, the GC can forestall a crisis by supplying M and keeping the market interest rate at r 12 , at which the banks' solvency stands marginally solvent. With the intervention underway, the liquidity market clearing condition is
where M is set such that the interest rate is kept at the level of r 12 . The ELP can be also interpreted as a low interest rate policy, since, for > L , the GC can place a cap on the market interest rate at r 12 r 12 . However, for a su¢ ciently high exceeding a certain level of the preference shock, the GC cannot keep the market interest rate at the level of r 12 because the maximum fund for the ELP is constrained at D. If the GC fails to provide enough liquidity at r 12 , a …nancial crisis is precipitated. We de…ne the threshold level of the liquidity preference shock, beyond which banks cannot remain solvent even with the ELP, by H :
In line with the notation for L , we express H as H (D) and its derivative as Now, we formally state the banks'problem. In an economy with non-zero probability of ELPs, banks maximize
[ ln (e 1 + X 1 ) + (1 ) ln (e 2 )] dF ( ) subject to (4), (12), (14), and m = e 2 =r 12 + D + e 1 . The …rst line corresponds to the utility for
and is unrelated to the bailout probability p because the economy is at a normal time.
The fourth line points to the utility for 2 ( H ; 1] and is also unrelated to the bailout probability because is so high that banks are insolvent regardless of the GC's bailouts. As indicated in the second and third lines, however, the utility for 2 ( L ; H ] varies conditionally on the GC's intervention to provide liquidity. In the second line, the utility is evaluated at the consumption at a crisis because the GC does not intervene. By contrast, the third line corresponds to the utility where the GC carries out the ELP. In the latter case, households attain the level of their utility on the brink of the crisis because the GC keeps the market interest rate exactly at r 12 = r 12 to maintain the banks'solvency.
Taking into account the GC's random attempts to prevent a crisis, the crisis probability is now given by
Clearly, the crisis probability depends negatively on the GC's policy stance on pursuing the …nancial stability. Other things being equal, a large p implies a low crisis probability.
4.3
The Safer, the More Secured?: Changes in the Policy Stance on the Financial Stability
Using the framework introduced in the previous section, we assess how the GC's policy stance on the …nancial stability a¤ects the probability of …nancial crises. As we discussed, the GC's policy stance on the …nancial stability -the economy's safety -is translated into p. In fact, as (15) indicates, an increase in p would suggest a lower probability of crises, if banks do not react to the change in p and keep the values of L and H with their leverage D held unchanged. However, banks would react to the increase in p, most likely by raising their leverage D. Hence,the ultimate question posed here is, how much net reduction in the crisis probability can be expected by the ELP when the banks'endogenous response is taken into account.
To answer this question, we calibrate the model with the ELP as follows. New parameter in this experiment is , the tax rate imposed on the banks liability. This is set to 0.03. Regarding and , we set them to the benchmark calibration, i.e., = 0:50 and = 0:07. Table 2 reports the results of this experiment. In our experiment, Case 1 with p = 0 can be interpreted as the "risky" economy where the troubled banks have no chance to be rescued. In
Case 3 with p = 1:0, the economy could be perceived to be "safer," because it is assumed that the GC always steps in the liquidity market to bailout the troubled banks. But, such perception is prima facie case of safety. In fact, the crisis probability slightly increases, rather than decreases, from 12.0 percent in Case 1 to 12.3 percent in Case 3. The GC's attempt to increase the safety of the economy does not make the economy safe, but, conversely, such an attempt makes the economy riskier. Figure 4 con…rms that the crisis probability is upward-sloping over a broad range of p.
This "the safer, the riskier" case can be again understood through banks' endogenous choice of their leverage. As the third row in the table indicates, banks raise their leverage in response to changes in the policy stance toward the …nancial stability (i.e., larger values for p). If banks do not react to the changes in the GC's policy stance, H and L remain unchanged. Then, the ex-ante crisis probability can be computed from (15) While these changes in the probability appear to be small in the magnitude measured by the crisis probability, the …nancial instability could be ampli…ed if the banks' endogenous choice of leverage is in ‡uenced by their optimistic perception on the GC's policy stance. As an extreme case, suppose that the GC are extremely worried about banks'moral hazard (p = 0:0) but banks incorrectly anticipate that the GC always helps the troubled banks (p = 1:0). Then, we again use a back-of-the-envelope calculation with the numbers in Table 2 to calculate the crisis probability.
We take H and L from Case 3 but evaluate given by (15) at p = 0:0. The consequence of the misperception is banks' overleverage and the excessively elevated crisis probability. In fact, the crisis probability is now calculated by
, which is 17.5 percent (i.e., = 1 F (0:566) = 0:175). Therefore, when banks are overoptimistic about the bailout probability, the …nancial instability could be ampli…ed easily and considerably.
We developed a model of …nancial instability with endogenously determined bank leverage to explore how changes in macroeconomic fundamentals a¤ect the probability of …nancial crises. Aggregate liquidity preference shock is useful in considering the endogenously changing crisis probability because such shocks can generally mimic broad types of other shocks (e.g., income shock and productivity shocks) that result in systemic bank runs via the same channel. Using our framework, which basically follows Diamond and Rajan (2012) with the above-mentioned aggregate shock, we perform the two experiments where the macroeconomic fundamentals change: (i) average declines in the liquidity preference (i.e., lower demand for liquidity) and (ii) rises in the probability of the government's ELP to bailout banks. We showed that, despite these exogenous improvements of the macroeconomic fundamentals, the banking system could expose the economy as a whole to higher risks of crises due to the banks' endogenous risk taking in response to the "safer" fundamentals.
We argue that these two experiments may help better understand the 2007-08 …nancial crisis which took place amid the allegedly sound and improved macroeconomic fundamentals.
Our analysis can be extended in a number of directions. First, the rationale of the government intervention was not fully speci…ed in our model. To better motivate the government intervention, the model may need to include welfare-reducing distortions, such as externalities and/or coordination failure, that have been emphasized in the recent studies. 11 Second, developing a full- ‡edged in…nite horizon dynamic model can promote better understanding of dynamics of …nancial crises and real economy. 12 Figure 1: Banks'leverage and utility Note: The solid line represents the utility level against the face value of deposits. The upward-sloping dashed line is the expected utility conditional on no bank run, and the downward-sloping dashed line is the expected utility conditional on a bank run. The calibration is based on the assumption that a liquidity shock follows a beta distribution with a mean of 0.50 and a standard deviation of 0.07. Note: Each column calibrates the mean ( ) and standard deviation ( ) of under the assumption that follows the beta distribution. The probability of bank runs , the threshold level of , and the level of deposits D are computed from the calibrated moments. Note: In each simulation, the mean and the standard deviation of is set to 0.5 and 0.07. The tax rate for bank levy is 0.03.
